for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under Section

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1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Id. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Allegations in a *pro se* complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (*per curiam*); *see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed *sua sponte*, however, if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (*e.g.* claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (*e.g.* fantastic or delusional scenarios). *See Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327-28; *see also McKeever v. Block*, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." *Hydrick v. Hunter*, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006).

II. Instant Complaint

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC"), has sued senior correctional officer David Carrol, wardens James Baca and Jim Benedetti, and Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") Director Howard Skolnik. Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 15, 2009, he was "verbally attacked" by David Carrol. He claims that Carrol told him "you will raise your hand

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at count time because you are in a wheelchair." Plaintiff claims he "took offense" to Carrol's statement and that Carrol's words subjected plaintiff to ridicule by other inmates and staff. Plaintiff submitted a grievance and asserts that he received his kite back with "AWP James Baca's threat in retaliation of my seeking redress." Plaintiff claims violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process and that he was threatened with retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights.

A. Verbal Harassment

Plaintiff claims that he was offended when defendant Carrol "verbally attacked" him, and that Jim Benedetti and Howard Skolnik were made aware of Carrol's conduct through the prison grievance process, but denied the grievance. However, mere verbal harassment or abuse is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part by Shakur v. Schiriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, plaintiff's claims that Carrol's alleged instance of verbal harassment violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Defendants Carrol, Benedetti and Skolnik are dismissed from this action.

B. Retaliation

With respect to the retaliation allegations: "A prisoner suing prison officials under [§] 1983 for retaliation must allege that he [or she] was retaliated against for exercising his [or her] constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005); Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167-1170-71 (9th Cir. 2004); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003); Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1997); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). There is a First Amendment right to petition the government through prison grievance procedures. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567; Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). "Retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this right is itself a constitutional violation," and a mere threat of retaliation is sufficient injury if made in retaliation for an inmate's use

of prison grievance procedures. *Brodheim v. Cry*, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing *Burgess v. Moore*, 39 F.3d 216, 218 (8th Cir. 1994); *see also Rhodes*, 408 F.3d at 566. Such claims must be evaluated in the light of the deference that must be accorded to prison officials. *See Pratt*, 65 F.3d at 807; *see also Vance v. Barrett*, 345 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The prisoner must submit evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to establish a link between the exercise of constitutional rights and the allegedly retaliatory action. *Compare Pratt*, 65 F.3d at 807 (finding insufficient evidence) with *Valandingham v. Bojorquez*, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding sufficient evidence). Timing of the events surrounding the alleged retaliation may constitute circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. *See Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan*, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989). Finally, the prisoner must demonstrate that his First Amendment rights were actually chilled by the alleged retaliatory action. *See Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Rhodes*, 408 F.3d at 568 (explaining that, at the pleading stage, a prisoner is not required "to demonstrate a *total* chilling of his [or her] First Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil litigation in order to perfect a retaliation claim. Speech can be chilled even when not completely silenced.") (emphasis in original); *Gomez v. Vernon*, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff alleges he received his kite dated September 21, 2009 back with "AWP James Baca's threat in retaliation of my seeking redress." Plaintiff's retaliation claim is so vague that the court is unable to determine whether it is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. Thus, this claim will be dismissed, but plaintiff will be granted leave to amend the complaint.

Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. However, plaintiff's allegations that he was threatened for using the prison grievance process may implicate his First Amendments rights. Therefore, plaintiff has leave to file an amended complaint. If plaintiff elects to proceed in this action by filing an amended complaint, he is advised that he should support his claim with specific factual allegations about the defendant's actions. Plaintiff's claims must be set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. *See Swierkeiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint

supersedes the original complaint. *See Loux v. Rhay*, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (Docket #1) without having to prepay the full filing fee is **GRANTED**; plaintiff shall not be required to pay an initial installment fee. Nevertheless, the full filing fee shall still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996. The movant herein is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of fees or costs or the giving of security therefor. This order granting *in forma pauperis* status shall not extend to the issuance of subpoenas at government expense.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996, the Nevada Department of Corrections shall pay to the Clerk of the United States District Court, District of Nevada, 20% of the preceding month's deposits to the account of Country Joe Stevens, Inmate No. 27883 (in months that the account exceeds \$10.00) until the full \$350 filing fee has been paid for this action. The Clerk shall send a copy of this order to the attention of Albert G. Peralta, Chief of Inmate Services for the Nevada Department of Prisons, P.O. Box 7011, Carson City, NV 89702.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, even if this action is dismissed, or is otherwise unsuccessful, the full filing fee shall still be due, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915, as amended by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall FILE the complaint (Docket #1-1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff's claims for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants David Carrol, Jim Benedetti and Howard Skolnik are **DISMISSED** from this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with respect to his claim of retaliation only.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff will have thirty (30) days from the date that this Order is entered to file his amended complaint, if he believes he can correct the noted deficiencies. The amended complaint must be a complete document in and of itself, and will supersede the original complaint in its entirety. Any allegations, parties, or requests for relief from prior papers that are not carried forward in the amended complaint will no longer be before the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff shall clearly title the amended complaint as such by placing the words "FIRST AMENDED" immediately above "Civil Rights Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983" on page 1 in the caption, and plaintiff shall place the case number, 3:10-CV-00277-LRH-VPC, above the words "FIRST AMENDED" in the space for "Case No."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is expressly cautioned that if he does not timely file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this case may be immediately dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall send to plaintiff a blank section 1983 civil rights complaint form with instructions along with one copy of the original complaint.

DATED this 19th day of July, 2010.

LARRY R. HICKS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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